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89-0556-CA

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF CASE
The Court

of Appeals

has

jurisdiction

over

this

matter

pursuant to §78-2a-3(2)(f) U.C.A. in that it is an appeal from a
final

judgment

and

criminal case.

conviction

from

the District

Court

in a

The proceeding below arose out of three separate

criminal cases with nearly identical factual backgrounds which
were consolidated at the Trial Court level, wherein each of the
individual Defendants was charged by amended

information filed

May 22, 1989, with Unlawful Possession of Controlled Substances,
on or about November 4, 1988, in violation of §58-37-8 U.C.A.
(Elkins, R. 24, 25; Brown R. 118, 119), and related third degree
felony offenses.

Defendants1 Motion To Suppress was denied by

the Trial Court June 1, 1989

(Elkins, R. 36-39).

Defendants

entered pleas of guilty, each to one count of possession of a
controlled

substance,

a third

degree

felony,

July

28, 1989,

(Elkins, R. 42,, 57; Brown, R. 128) subject to a reservation of
right

to appeal

from the Order Denying

Defendantsf

Motion To

Suppress (Transcript of Change of Plea).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR APPEAL
The May 15, 1989, FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND
ORDER, denying Appellants1 Motion to Suppress, entered June 1,
1989, (Elkins R. 36-39) raises the following issues:
1.

The

Search

Warrant

Affidavit

failed

to

establish

probable cause to support the Search Warrant.
2.
U.S.

897

The "Good Faith" exception of United States v. Leon, 468
(1984) cannot

save a Search Warrant
3

based

upon

an

Affidavit so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render
official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.
3.

The Trial Court erred in failing to find that the Search

Warrant Affidavit contains false and misleading information.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Interpretation of the following constitutional provisions is
determinative of the issues presented.

The Fourth Amendment to

the United States Constitution, and its identical counterpart,
Article I, Section 14 of The Utah State Constitution, provide as
follows:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no warrants shall issue*, but
upon probable cause, supported by oath and
affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The cases against the three individual Defendants/Appellants
were filed separately and subsequently consolidated

into two

separate files, one for the Elkins Appellants, Appellate No.
890555-CA and 890556, the other for Appellant Robert Brown,
Appellate No. 890554-CA.

It is a matter of minor confusion

worthy of mention that the various filings were apparently done
by the clerks without a great deal of thought.

As a consequence

Elkins pleadings found their way into Brown's file and viceversa.
R.

All references to the record hereinafter will be "Brown,

" or "Elkins, R.

" as appropriate.

The reversed filing is

merely noted to obviate any initial confusion as to why citations
4

to the record may appear to be inapposite.
confusion

Suffice it to say the

is minimal, if inconvenient, and

all

pleadings

applicable to the individual Appellants found their way into one
file or the other.
Appellant Robert Brown was initially charged

in Third

Circuit Court by Information November 18, 1988, alleging one
count of Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance With
Intent to Distribute a Controlled Substance, Marijuana, 58-378(2)(a)(i) U.C.A., on or about November 4, 1988, a third degree
felony (Brown, R. 20, 21).
Elkins

were

initially

Information alleging

Defendants David Elkins and Susan

charged

in Third

two counts, Count

Circuit

Court by

I, Production of a

Controlled Substance, Marijuana, 58-37-8(1)(a)(i), U.C.A., and
Count II, Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance, 58-378(2)(a)(i), U.C.A., Psilocin Mushrooms, third degree felonies, on
or about November 4, 1988 (Brown, R, 15 and 16).
From combined proceedings, preliminary hearings held before
Honorable Paul Grant, Third Circuit Court, on January 3, 1989,
Defendant/Appellants were bound over to stand trial in the Third
District Court as charged (Elkins, R. 13, 14; Brown, R. 24, 25).
On March 3, 1989, Appellants Moved in the District Court to
suppress all evidence resulting from the execution of a Search
Warrant and resulting seizure of items from their respective
residences (Brown, R. 55,56).
A hearing of the evidentiary issues raised in Appellants'
Motion To Suppress was granted and had before the Honorable Frank
G.

Noel,

March

8,

1989

(Elkins,
5

R.

78, Transcript

of

Proceedings).

Appellants' Motion was denied by the Trial Court

by its Minute Entry of April 5, 1989 (Elkins, R. 36, 39), entered
June 1, 1989.
The State moved

to Amend

the

Information

as to each

Appellant January 6, 1989 (Brown, R. 48 49), which motion was
granted, subject to the Trial Court's further Order remanding the
added or alternative charges to Circuit Court

for

further

preliminary hearing, which Order was entered June 1, 1989 (Brown,
R. 120, 121; Elkins, R. 40, 41).

The Amended Informations were

filed May 22, 1989 (Elkins, R. 24, 25; Brown, R. 118, 119).
On July 18, 1989, each of the Appellants waived their right
to further preliminary hearing on the Amended Information (Brown,
R. 125, Docketing Statement; Elkins, R.9, Docketing Statement).
To Count II of the Amended Information Appellants Susan
Elkins and David Elkins entered their pleas of guilty to the
charge of Possession of a Controlled Substance, Marijuana, With
Intent to Distribute, 58-37-8(1)(a) (i) U.C.A., a third degree
felony.

Count I (possession of mushrooms) was dismissed on

Motion of the State (Elkins, R. 42, 57).

On the same date

Appellant Robert Brown entered a plea of guilty to the first
alternative of Count I of the Amended Information, Possession of
a Controlled Substance, Marijuana, With Intent to Distribute, 5837-8(l)(a)(i), U.C.A., a third degree felony (Brown, R. 128).
The transcript of proceedings July 28, 1989, of the guilty
pleas of each of the Appellants reflects that the guilty pleas
were entered conditionally and subject to Appellants' right to
appeal the denial of their Motion To Suppress pursuant to State
6

v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 87 Utah Adv. Rep. 32, (1988) (R. 78,
Transcript of Change of Plea Proceedings, pp 1,2).
Each of the Appellants was sentenced Honorable Frank G.
Noel, Judge Presiding, September 1, 1989, to the indeterminate
term not to exceed five years, stayed upon condition of two years
probation (Brown, R. 165, 164; Elkins, R. 58, 61).
From

the Judgment

and Sentence of the Court

entered

September 5, 1989, and the "Order Denying Defendants' Motion For
Reconsideration" of Appellatefs Motion To Suppress filed July 28,
1989 (Brown, R. 136-151), Appellants bring this appeal.
Notice of Appeal was filed and entered September 6, 1989
(Brown, R. 155; Elkins, R. 64, 69).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

Appellants argue that the Search Warrant which was

executed on their homes was not supported by a Search Warrant
Affidavit which, given the totality of circumstances, was not
grounded

in sufficient

articulable particularized

facts to

establish probable cause.
2.

Appellants argue further that the Search Warrant was so

clearly lacking in probable cause, that the Warrant consisted in
the mere ratification of the bare unfounded conclusions of
others, and that the Magistrate's determination reflected an
improper analysis of the totality of the circumstances presented
by the Affidavit, to such an extent as to be incapable of
providing valid authorization for the search of their homes.
3.

Appellants

argue that certain

statements

in the

Affidavit, particularly with respect to observance of the
7

silhouette of a Marijuana Leaf, was false, recklessly make, and
that the Trial Court erred in not suppressing evidence produced
as a result of a search based upon such misleading statements in
the Affidavit.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On or about November 4, 1988, The Honorable Dennis Fuchs,
Judge of the Third (then Fifth) Circuit Court in and for Salt
Lake County, Utah, issued a Search Warrant for premises at 1268
Montgomery Street and 1276 Montgomery Street in Salt Lake City,
Utah.

The Search Warrant and the Affidavit for Search Warrant

were introduced into evidence at the hearing on the Motion To
Suppress,

as Exhibit

"1" and

reproduced in the addendum.

" 2 " , respectively,

and

are

(Transcript of Motion To Suppress,

p. 59).
On November

4, 1988, police officers

Narcotics Strike Force executed

from

the Metro-

the Search Warrant

on the

residence and attached structures, of Robert Brown, at 1276
Montgomery, and David and Susan Elkins at 1268 Montgomery, in
Salt Lake City, Utah.

The evidence, specifically quantities of

Marijuana taken from each of the houses, provided the basis of
the charges before the Trial Court (Brown, R. 119; Elkins, R.
25).
This

appeal

stems

from

the

Trial

Court's

denial

of

Appellants' efforts to cause the evidence seized pursuant to this
Search Warrant to be suppressed.

8
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Gates, 462 U.S. 213 at 238(1983).
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9 3 P. 2d 9 2 0 , 9 7 I IT.

Magistrate to conclude tha t: probable cause existed,
v
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./arrant
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basis"
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See Illinois

Illinois v. Gates,, id, changed the course, to some extent,
of existing law.

The decision in Gates overruled what was

characterized as "mechanistic application" of the so called "two
pronged test" established by Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108(1964)
and Spinelli v. U.S., 393 U.S. 410(1969).

Prior to Gates the

"two pronged test" was utilized when, as in the Affidavit before
the Court in this case, information from an unidentified or
otherwise unknown informant was the basis of the information
contained in the Affidavit which formed the predicate for the
Warrant.
The Aguilar - Spinelli "two pronged test" worked in the
following fashion.

Under the first, the "basis of knowledge"

prong, facts must be revealed which would permit the judicial
officer to conclude that the informant had a basis for his
allegations,
conclusions.
sufficient

i.e.,

"articulable

The second,

facts" as opposed

to mere

"veracity", prong, requires that

information be supplied

to establish either the

inherent "credibility" of the informant or the "reliability" of
his information on this particular occasion.

LaFave, Search and

Seizure, 2d Ed., Chapter 3, p. 613; Aguilar v. Texas, supra;
Spinelli v. U.S., supra.
These factors (the two prongs) still retain considerable
significance under Gates in the sense that they merit careful
consideration. For this reason the basic rationale of Aguilar and
Spinelli is still a viable and practical tool for analysis, if
not as an exclusive determinative formula. What the Gates Court
says is required

is a view by the reviewing
10
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a more global approach:
• . • an informants "veracity," "reliability", ai id
"basis of knowledge" are all highly relevant in
determining the value of his report.... (These
elements) should be understood simply as closely
intertwined issues that may usefully illuminate
the common sense, practical question whether there
is "probable cause" to believe that contraband or
e v i d e n c e is l o c a t e d in a p a r t i c u l a r p l a c e .
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. at 230.
...(these e l e m e n t s ) are
Detter understood as
relevant considerations i .u the totality-of-thec i r c u m s t a n c e s analysis that traditionally has
guided probable cause determinations: a deficiency
in one may be compensated for, in determining the
over all reliability of a tip, by a strong showing
as to the other, or by some other indicia of
r e l i a b i l i t y , ( c i t a t i o n s o m i t t e d ) Illinois v.
Gates, 462 IJ S. at 233.
\
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Crime

unknowns' "basis of knowledge", "veracity", or "reliability" is
factually substantiated with any particulars whatsoever.
Tests

for

evaluating

informant

information

have

traditionally been based upon factors such as past performance of
the informant, admissions against the informant's interest, selfverifying detail, disclosure of basis of knowledge, sufficiency
of information, et cetera.
vitiating
tests.

or diminishing

Nothing in Gates can be construed as
the relevance or importance of

these

They are explicitly deemed relevant.

As to the "basis of knowledge" question, there is absolutely
no way of knowing what, if any, "articulable facts" formed the
basis of 6637's conclusions, because they are not set forth in
the Affidavit.

There is no answer to the query, how did 6637

come to the conclusion's he drew(?)
he see it?

What did he see and when did

The primary (6637) informant's statements, whenever

they were made, do not disclose how he concluded that Marijuana
was grown at either house. What training or experience did he
possess?

What did he see and when?

The specificity

for the

first informant's conclusions is absent.
The

curious

confronted
brought
getting.
"...a

statement

children

from

who

that

have

"6637

possessed

stated

that

baggies

these buildings," is emotion-laden

he

has

of

Marijuana

and

attention

It is however an incredible assertion, even if he had

particularized

interest

in the welfare

of

one

of

the

children," whatever that is supposed to mean and remains devoid
of

factual

foundation.

How

did

6637

know

"obtained" Marijuana "from these buildings"?
12

the

"children"

How did he know it

was

Marijuana?
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D O gather .jnd

e Affiant simply states that: h e
-

a I: toe HI .is*1

he- i" i in fi vniianf "i fully

identified himself to Crime Solvers."

So what?

This statement,

apart from providing no information, begs the question:

Who is

the informant and what is "Crime Solvers"?

Why should the

Magistrate trust either the informant, or

"Crime Solvers"?

"Crime Solvers" is not an arm of the Salt Lake County Attorney's
office, or some other Governmental Agency to which this Court
should give deference?

It isn't entitled to judicial notice.

Whatever talismanic qualities "Crime Solvers" may have, they
do not ascend to the level of establishing, ipso facto, the
"reliability" and

"veracity" of every crackpot who calls in,

identifies himself, and says he "confronted children"

flaunting

little baggies of Marijuana.
Even the reliability and veracity of whatever person(s) were
involved at "Crime Solvers" remains a mystery.
actual

person(s) at

Certainly the

"Crime Solvers" ought at least to be

identified, or alternatively his/her and its reliability in some
way established.
of

unidentified

"reliability"

and

"Crime Solvers" is merely a second in a chain
informants

whose

"basis

of

knowledge",

"veracity" must be improperly

assumed as

established to sustain this Search Warrant.
The Affidavit treats all these matters as given. But "basis
of knowledge", "reliability", and "veracity,"

are not such

clearly indisputable matters that they might simply be judicially
noticed under Rule 201, U.R.E. Evidentiary facts are required.
Note the language of the Utah Supreme Court as long ago as 1943:
...the affidavit must set forth facts
sufficient to cause a discreet and prudent
man to believe that the accused had the
property sought to be seized. The fact that
14

the affiant says he has that belief, in and
of itself, is not sufficient to make 'probable
cause.
Furthermore, the allegation in the
affidavit that said defendant has twice
during the past three months been arrested
and convicted for the illegal use of said
bottles, and that he refused to refrain from
using them is not sufficient to make probable
cause as contemplated by the general statute
or the Constitution.
The affidavit in this
case further sets forth that defendant now
freely admits that he is continuing the use
thereof.
This is a mere conclusion of the
affiant; no facts being set forth upon which
a complaint for perjury could be predicated
if falsely given.
The substance of the
admission is not given nor is the person
named to whom the purported admission was
made.
The affidavit does not show probable
cause to exist for the issuance of a search
and seizure warrant under the general laws
and the Constitution of the State of Utah.
Allen v. Holbrook, 135 P.2d at 247. (Emphasis
added)
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impossible to check what they were and independently determine
whether or not they were of any probative value whatsoever.

Did

they merely verify that two brick houses stood side by side, or
were there more sinister details?

It is not possible to check

the accuracy of the Affiant's conclusion from this Affidavit
because there are no facts recited which would facilitate such an
analysis.

Certainly no prosecution for perjury could be mounted,

which has been used as a test of sufficient particulars, because
the conclusions are too diffuse and conclusionary.

Allen v.

Holbrook, supra.
The Affiant further fails to provide any basis for his own
naked conclusion that he smelled growing Marijuana or saw the
silhouette of a Marijuana Leaf through a "translucent" panel.
These are simply more foundationless, barren legal and factual
conclusions.

Which house was the Affiant even talking about and

at what point in time?

From which if either house did the smell

emanate? If the pre-view of the residences took place in summer
or fall there would presumably be an abundance of vegetation
around the canal.

How did the Affiant distinguish Marijuana from

the ambient smell from the water and weeds?

Or was it winter?

Where was the leaf silhouette? What did the leaf silhouette look
like?

Was it similar to what the Affiant had been trained to

observe?

What training does this Affiant have, if any, to

recognize either sight or smell of growing Marijuana as opposed
to various other plants, waterborne vegetation, and growing
things?
Affiant?

How opaque was the "translucent" material?

Who is the

Who is Robert Caffrey, if not the Affiant (reference is
16
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setting forth articulable facts rather than naked assertions of
conclusions.

Gates did not set the stage for the mere "rubber

stamp" approval by the Magistrate of the "bare conclusions of
others."
Our earlier cases illustrate the limits
beyond which a magistrate may not venture in
issuing a warrant. A sworn statement of an
affiant that "he has cause to suspect and
does believe" that liquor illegally brought
into the United States is located on certain
premises will not do.
Nathanson v. United
States, 290 U.S. 41(1933). An affidavit must
provide the magistrate with a substantial
basis for determining the existence of
probable cause, and the wholly conclusory
statement at issue in Nathanson failed to
meet this requirement.
An officer T s
statement that "[a]ffiants have received
reliable information from a credible person
and do believe" that heroin is stored in a
home, is likewise inadequate.
Aguilar v.
Texas, 378 U.S. 108(1964). As in Nathanson,
this is a mere conclusory statement that
gives the magistrate virtually no basis at
all for making a judgement regarding probable
cause.
Sufficient information must be
presented to the magistrate to allow that
official to determine probable cause; his
action cannot be a mere ratification of the
bare conclusions of others.
In order to
ensure that such an abdication of the
magistrate's duty does not occur, courts must
continue to conscientiously review the
sufficiency of affidavits on which warrants
are issued.
Illinois v. Gates 462 U.S. at
239. (Emphasis added)
The information attributed to the informant via

"Crime

Solvers" is so conclusory, unsubstantiated and without inferable
credibility or reliability, and the "verifying" information is
nothing more than the naked conclusions of an Affiant no better
known

than

6637,

that

it could

establishing probable cause.
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not

provide

a basis

for

How

! .

trie Magistrate know any

conclusions ure trustworthy?
more

thar. suppositioi

.L these people or their

Probable Cause must be grounde<i in

Before

authorizing

citizens'

justifying

search

> -• that

•

done on assumption.

the

uticu-ar

ol

a

J I is not

intrusion

the

Affidavit must point to specific and "articulable facts" which,
together

wi th

the

LdLioiidi

mieiences

reasonably warrant that intrusion.

L rom

those

Terry v. Ohio, 392 '

fact s,
c

',

88 S.Ct. 1868, 1880(1968).'

1

The Supreme Court of The United States made the following
statement in specific reference to the requirement of
"articulable facts" in the landmark decision of Terry v. Oho, 88
S.Ct. 1868, at 1880 in footnote 18:
This demand for specificity in the information upon
which police action is predicated is the central
teaching
of t h i s C o u r t ' s F o u r t h
Amendment
jurisprudence. See Beck v. State of Ohio, 379 U.S. 89
96-97, 85 S.Ct. 223, 229, 13 L.Ed. 2d 142 (1964); Kerr
v. State of California, 374 U.S. 23, 34-37, 83 S.Ct.
1623, 1632, 10 L.Ed.2d 726(1963); Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. 471, 479-484, 83 S.Ct. 407, 416, 9
L.Ed.2d 441 (1963); Rios v. United States, 364 U.S.
253, 261-262, 80 S.Ct. 1431, 1437, 4 L.Ed.2d 1688
(1960); Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 100-102,
80 S.Ct. 168, 171, L.Ed.2d 134 (1959); Draper v. United
States, 358 U.S. 307, 312-314, 79 S.Ct. 329, 333, 3
L.Ed.2d 327 (1959); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S.
160, 175-178, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 1312, 93 L.Ed. 1879
(1949); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 15017,
68 S.Ct. 367, 371, 92 L.Ed. 436 (1948); United States
v. Pi Re, 332 U.S. 581, 593-595, 68 S.Ct. 222, 229, 92
L.Ed. 210 (1948); Husty V. United States, 282 U.S. 694,
700-701, 51 S.Ct. 240, 242, 75 L.Ed. 629 (1931); Dunbra
v. United States, 268 U.S. 435, 551, 45 S.Ct. 546, 549,
69 L.Ed. 1032 (1925); Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. 132, 159-162, 45 S.Ct. 280, 288, 69 L.Ed. 543
(1925); Stacey v. Emery, 97 U.S. 642, 645, 24 L.Ed.
1035 (1878).
This statement of the law has obviously wi
.. ,f time and is appropriate and applicable today.
i

The Affidavit before this Court leaves unanswered virtually
all of the important factual questions, which must be inferred,
assumed or divined.

Issuance of a Search Warrant on such a state

of facts is an affront to both sovereigns1 Constitutions.
Another grave deficiency in the Affidavit is its complete
failure

to

set

forth any time

frame

for the

information, receipt of the information by

informant's

"Crime Solvers",

Affiant's receipt of the information from Crime Solvers, and when
the Affiant

came

into

possession

of

any

of

the

recited

an Arrest

Warrant

information.
A

Search

Warrant

Affidavit

unlike

Affidavit must set forth some information in order to place the
events recited in time. The following discussion elucidates the
reasons why this is so:
The most obvious difference between probable
cause to arrest and probable cause to search
is that the former is concerned with
historical facts while the latter is
concerned with facts relating to a presently
existing condition. If a police officer is
summoned to a crime scene and is told by the
victim and several witnesses that an armed
robbery has occurred and that a particular
person known to them by name committed it,
there then exists probable cause to arrest
that person.
Assuming no contrary facts
later come to light this probable cause will
continue to exist for an indefinite period.
But this quite obviously is not so with
respect to the probable cause that the robber
has the fruits of the crime concealed in his
residence. Though it may be permissible to
assume without direct proof that the robber
had taken the stolen goods to his residence,
so that a warrant for that place could issue
a day or so following the robbery, it cannot
be likewise assumed that these goods will
remain there indefinitely.
If the search
20

warrant were sought weeks or months after the
crime and without more current information
tending to show that the stolen property was
presently in that place, the judicial officer
would be compelled to conclude that probable
cause was lacking.
Search cases, then, in
contrast to arrest cases, present the unique
problem of whether the information relied
upon to establish probable cause has grown
"stale." LaFave, Search and Seizure, 2d Ed.,
Chapter 3, p. 75-76. (Emphasis Added)
One Court has recently refused to uphold a Search Warrant
for this very reason on facts strikingly similar to the instant
case:
...we do not hold that the absence of a
reference to time in an affidavit makes the
subsequent warrant automatically defective.
Rather, in such a situation, we look to the
four corners of the affidavit to determine if
we can establish with certainty the time
during which the criminal activity was
observed.
If the time can be inferred in
this manner, then the police officer's
objective good faith reliance on the
magistrate's assessment will cure the
omission.
Here, however, the omission of any reference
to time is so complete that none can be
inferred.
The only statements that are in
the present tense are those pre-printed on
the form.
The information supplied by the
affiant is imprecise ("I have probable cause
to believe that on or in" (emphasis added))
and is worded in the past tense. There are
no terms such as "recently" or "now" and no
reference to an urgent situation ...which
would enable the court to ascertain the time
factor.
Accordingly the affidavit is
defective and the warrant invalid.
An affidavit such as this, with absolutely no
reference to a time frame, does not provide
sufficient information upon which a probable
cause determination can be made. Herrington
v. State, 697 S.W.2d 899, 900-901 (Ark.
1985).
21

The Affidavit in the case at bar falls squarely within this
holding.

Appellants are aware of Utah authorities which would

ignore this requirement, however, Appellants urge that under
these circumstances such cases are not in point because the
Affidavit is otherwise so sadly deficient.
Considering all of the relevant factors this Affidavit fails
to satisfy the most primitive notion of minimum standards and
should be held to be insufficient to satisfy the "totality-of-the
circumstances" test.
POINT II
THE "GOOD FAITH" EXCEPTION OF UNITED STATES V. LEON,
468 U.S. 897 (1984) CANNOT SAVE A SEARCH WARRANT BASED
UPON AN AFFIDAVIT SO LACKING IN INDICIA OF PROBABLE
CAUSE AS TO RENDER OFFICIAL BELIEF IN ITS EXISTENCE
ENTIRELY UNREASONABLE.
In United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), the Supreme
Court of the United States held that the exclusionary rule should
not apply when the officer conducting

the search acted in

objectively reasonable reliance on a Warrant issued by a neutral
and detached Magistrate that subsequently is determined to be
invalid.
The State will undoubtedly make a great point of urging the
"good-faith" doctrine of United States vs. Leon, i.d., upon this
Court and of impressing upon the Court the "great deference" to
be paid a Magistrate's determination of probable cause.
However, the Supreme Court also made very clear that Courts
were not simply to unquestioningly accept every Search Warrant.
The Supreme

Court

in Leon, i.d.,

analysis:
22

set forth the

following

"Deference to the magistrate, however, is not
boundless.
It is clear, first, that the
deference accorded to a magistrate's finding
of probable cause does not preclude inquiry
into the knowing or reckless falsity of the
affidavit on which that determination was
based. Second, the courts must also insist
that the magistrate purport to "perform his
'neutral and detached' function and not serve
merely as a rubber stamp for the police." A
magistrate failing to "manifest that
neutrality and detachment demanded of a
judicial officer when presented with a
warrant application" and who acts instead as
"an adjunct law enforcement officer" cannot
provide valid authorization for an otherwise
unconstitutional search.
Third, reviewing courts will not defer to a
warrant based on an affidavit that does not
"provide the magistrate with a substantial
basis for determining the existence of
probable cause".
"Sufficient information
must be presented to the magistrate to allow
that official to determine probable cause;
his action cannot be a mere ratification of
the bare conclusions of others." Even if the
warrant application was supported by more
than a "bare bones" affidavit, a reviewing
c o u r t may p r o p e r l y c o n c l u d e t h a t ,
n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g the deference that
magistrates deserve, the warrant was invalid
because the magistrate's probable-cause
determination reflected an improper analysis
of the totality of the circumstances, or
because the form of the warrant was improper
in some respect. U.S. vs. Leon, 82 L.Ed. 2d
at 693-694 (footnotes and citations omitted).
The Supreme Court of Arkansas, in its discussion of the Leon
exception and those factors causing it to find a Search Warrant
be constitutionally unsupportable, reasoned as follows:
"In Leon, the Supreme Court not only
announced the good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule, it also delineated four
errors which an officer's objective good
faith cannot cure. These occur (1) when the
magistrate is misled by information the
affiant knew was false; (2) if the magistrate
wholly abandons his detached and neutral
judicial role; (3) when the affidavit is "so
23

lacking in indicia of probable cause as to
render official belief in its existence
entirely unreasonable", quoting Brown vs.
Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 610-11, 95 S.Ct.
2254, 2265, 45 L.Ed. 2d 416 (1975); and (4)
when a warrant is so facially deficient "that
the executing officers cannot reasonably
presume it to be valid", Leon, supra, 104
S.Ct. at pp. 3421-22.
In its discussion of
the third exception, the Court explained,
"sufficient information must be presented to
the magistrate to allow that official to
determine probable cause; his action cannot
be a m e r e r a t i f i c a t i o n of the b a r e
conclusions of others," quoting Illinois vs.
Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76
L.Ed.2d 527 (1983 ) .Herrington vs. State,
supra, 697 S.W.2d 899, 901 (Ark. 1985).
Regardless of any other information or analysis which might
apply to the Search Warrant taken as a whole, the Court must
conclude

that,

by

probable

cause was

even

the

stated.

most

flexible

The Affidavit

of

standards,

is void

no

of even a

passing reference for example to any facts in support of a search
of 1276 Montgomery, the Brown residence, and no evidence suggests
that

probable

cause

ever did exist with respect

to

it. Only

slightly less suspect is 1268 Montgomery, the Elkins residence.
There was no "substantial basis" for issuance of the Warrant for
either home and it could not be deemed "objectively reasonable"
to conclude that such probable cause did exist under

Leon or

otherwise.
It is also submitted that certain facts simply must be set
forth, e.g., who and what the Affiant is, when the information
was gathered, and some basis for the conclusions drawn.

There is

not one scintilla of admissible evidence which would support a
finding

of

probable

cause.

Even in administrative

decisions

there must be a "residuum" of competent legal evidence (more than
24

a scintilla) in order to escape reversal on appeal for being
"arbitrary and capricious".
P.2d 413 (Ct. App. 1987).

See e.g., Kehl v. Schwendiman, 735

The "residuum rule" is obviously not a

standard for review here, however, Defendants do believe that at
least a scintilla of legally competent evidence should attend the
finding

of probable cause in order to satisfy

the Fourth

Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I,
Section 14 of the Utah State Constitution.

The Affidavit in the

instant matter contains not a single scintilla of such evidence.
Search Warrant Affidavits don't need to be hyper-technical.
But they are not prepared by laymen.

They are drafted by

prosecuting attorneys for the most part, who are well versed in
the elements which make evidence admissible and reliable and can
readily be counted upon present the articulable particularized
facts when called upon.
The Search Warrant Affidavit in the case before this Court
was so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to make official
belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.

It fails to meed

minimum standards of providing a substantial basis grounded in
specific facts.

The Magistrate's action in issuing the Warrant

constituted a mere ratification of the bare conclusions of others
and the Warrant was wholly invalid because the Magistrate's
probable cause determination reflected an improper analysis of
the totality of the circumstances.

Such a Search Warrant cannot

provide valid authorization even for an otherwise unlawful
search.

U.S. v. Leon, supra, 82 L.ed.2d at 693-694.

These Appellants stand as surrogates for every man.
25

Their

rights are the rights of us all.

Our society is what it is

because of these constitutional protections, not in spite of
them.

It is the measure of the evolvement of civilization in

this State not how we treat our best citizens, but how we treat
our worst.
concern.

Consequently, a case such as this is of critical

If the message of this case is that the police in Utah

may rely on the Magistrates and the Magistrates on the police, on
whom

may

the

citizens

rely

to protect

their

justifiable

expectation of privacy under Article I, Section 14 and the Fourth
Amendment?
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND THAT
THE SEARCH WARRANT AFFIDAVIT CONTAINS FALSE
AND MISLEADING INFORMATION.
The Affidavit states that the "silhouette of a Marijuana
Leaf", and what appeared to be Marijuana Plants were seen by the
Affiant, at 1268 Montgomery.
As it turns out, a belatedly identified "Officer" Caffrey,
in his later testimony, recanted and confessed that what he said
he saw in the Affidavit he did not and could not have seen.

Note

the following colloquy between defense counsel and Mr. Caffrey:
Q:

let me interrupt you just a second. Your Affidavit
indicates that you observed the silhouette of a
Marijuana Leaf. Where was that leaf in relationship to
the houses?

A:

That was on the inside pressed against this translucent
panel of the greenhouse, attached to 1268 Montgomery
Street. And it would be on the South wall of this
greenhouse, near where it intersects with the West
wall.

Q:

When you went in and executed the Search Warrant which
was the same day on the house, you observed that that
in fact was not a Marijuana Plant?
26

A:

Correct.

T. p.69 1.5-17.

Mr. Caffrey was 45-50 feet away, which he admitted, when he
purportedly made this observation.

T. p.70 1.8-12.

The Court

can view the "translucent" panel from the same vantage point,
notwithstanding

a lot of snow, by reviewing

the original

photographs submitted to the Trial Court in support of Appellants
Motion To Suppress, Brown, R. 82-86, specifically R. 84.
Defendants1 Exhibit 3, a photo taken by the police, clearly
illustrates that the "vine" which turned out not to be, or to be
anything even remotely similar to, the five pronged Marijuana
Leaf "silhouette" Caffrey swore he saw in the Affidavit doesn't
really look like anything.

Caffrey testified that one could make

out the likeness to Marijuana "even better" in Exhibit 3 than on
his pre-affidavit visit. Exhibit 3, however, literally shows
nothing comprehensible.

It certainly was incomprehensible from

the other side of the panel at least 50 feet away whatever it
was.

Affiants statement in regard to what was seen was patently

false.
Unfortunately, Exhibit 3, a polaroid photograph taken by the
police, but introduced into evidence by Appellants, has not
survived and is not now in the record.
counsel checked

out the record.

It was missing when

Appellants1

counsel will

continue to search for it and supplement the record if it can be
found.
Police officers, it has often been observed, are "engaged in
the often competitive enterprise of ferreting

out crime".

Johnson v. U.S., 68 S.Ct. 367, 369, 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
27

This

competitive aspect undoubtedly provides fertile soil to nurture
the seeds of predisposition.
to

see

and

smell

what

That the officers were predisposed
they

could

not

reasonableness" have done is without question.

in

"objective

That they did not

see the distinctive five pronged narrow leaves of a Marijuana
Plant is evident from the evidence.

The expert testimony,

Exhibit 3, and Mr. Caffrey's own testimony indicate that such
observations could not have been and were not made.
A:

The Marijuana Leaf has a serrated edges along with
cilia, the hairs along it. But I know you could
see that through the plastic that was covering it.
a very small serration where the hashish hangs in
middle of that serration.

the
not
Its
the

Q:

The statements indicate, including the one pressed
against the panel, that I ("it", sic.) had the
silhouette of a Marijuana Leave.

A:

Right.

Q:

How strong is your opinion with respect to that?

A:

I don't believe you could identify that as a Marijuana
Plant using my standard when I was an officer, to say
that is a Marijuana Plant.

Q:

You certainly couldn't see the cilia or hairs under the
leaves, could you?

A:

No.

Q:

And you wouldn't be able to see the serrated edge?

A:

Not from a distance.
p.18, 1.3-23.

(Testimony Krista Pickens, T.

Such representations did mislead Judge Fuchs acting as the
Magistrate and it was reckless to present it in the fashion
presented.

This was not judicial error.

It was sloppy,

shorthand police work, which should not be countenanced.
"The good faith exception for searches
conducted pursuant to Warrants is not
28

intended to signal our unwillingness to
strictly enforce the requirements of the
Fourth Amendment, and we do not believe it
will have this effect."
U.S. vs. Leon, 82
L.Ed.2d at 699.
The

Affiant

had

to

seriously

doubt

the

truth

of

his

averments regarding smell and certainly sight. (See T. p.20, 1.24)

No

other

reasonable.
evidence

conclusion,

given

the

objective

evidence,

is

Therefore, the Search Warrant must be voided and the

excluded

even

if this Court were to believe

facial existence of probable cause.

in the

Delaware v. Franks, 94 S.Ct.

2674, 438 U.S. 154 (1978).
As stated in the previously quoted decision of Johnson v.
U.S. ,
"[3,4]
The point of the Fourth Amendment,
which often is not grasped by zealous
o f f i c e r s , is not that it d e n i e s law
e n f o r c e m e n t the support of the usual
inferences which reasonable men draw from
evidence.
Its protection consists in
requiring that those inferences be drawn by a
neutral and detached magistrate instead of
being judged by the officer engaged in the
often competitive enterprise of ferreting out
crime". Supra, 68 S.Ct. 369.
To present false information subverts the function of the
Magistrate.
The case of Delaware v. Franks, 438 U.S. 154, 57 L.Ed.2d
667, 98 S.Ct. 2674(1978), states that where an Affidavit is shown
to

contain

incorrect

information

which

was

knowingly

and

intentionally made, or made with reckless disregard of the truth,
"bad

faith" is shown and unless the Warrant can be

independently, its fruits must be suppressed.

29

supported

This is, to state

a tautology, the antithesis of the good faith required by Leon,
supra.
A reckless or knowingly false statement that misleads the
Magistrate into issuing a Warrant which should not have been
issued subverts the neutral and detached Magistrate requirement,
and should not be countenanced,

Delaware v. Franks, supra.

CONCLUSION
The Court's Order Denying Appellants1 Motion to Suppress
should be reversed, this case remanded, and

bhe Trial Court

ordered to allow Appellants to withdraw their pleas of guilty.
Dated this

day of March, 1990.

Herschel Bullen
McDonald and Bullen
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the

day of March, 1990, I

caused to be served a true and accurate copy of the foregoing
Brief

of Appellants

upon the

following

named

persons by

depositing said document in the United States Mail, postage
prepaid, addressed as follows:
Paul Van Dam
State Attorney General
236 State Capitol Bldg
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
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DAVID E. YOCOM
Salt Lake County Attorney
HOWARD R. LEMCKE
Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney
231 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Phone:
(801) 363-7900

IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR SAJLT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SEARCH WARRANT

No.

SQlCffi

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH
To any peace officer in the State of Utah,
Proof by Affidavit under oath having been made this day before me
by[£T, fofcfCT Cffif^y/
/ I am" satisfied that there is probable
cause to believe, J
That
(X) on the premises known as 1268 Montgomery, one story
brown brick residence, 1276 Montgomery, one story red
brick residence, with a common driveway and backyard,
the curtilage of both and a white shed behind 1268
Montgomery,
In the City of Salt Lake, County of Salt Lake, State
is now certain property or evidence described as:

of

Utah,

there

Marijuana plants, psychedelic mushrooms, paraphernalia used
for growing, harvesting, and processing these plants,
and that said property or evidence:
(X)
(X)
(X)
(X)

was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed, or
has been used to commit or conceal a public offense, or
is being possessed with the purpose to use it as a
means of committing or concealing a public offense, or
consists of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal
conduct, possessed by a party to the illegal conduct.

You are therefore commanded
(X)

in the day time, until ^JcrTUXT"p.m.

to make a search of the above-named or described premises for the
herein-above described property or evidence and if you find the same

PAGE 2
SEARCH WARRANT
or any part thereof, to bring it forthwith before me at the Fifth
Circuit Court, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, or retain such
property in your custody, subject to the order of this court.
GIVEN UNDER MY HAND and dated this

y

dav,.a£_Novemberf 1988.

JUDG^^TaTU^^J^TR^CIRCUI T COURT

iHi^ooo II
DAVID E . YOCOM

Salt Lake County Attorney
HOWARD R. LEMCKE
Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney
231 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Phone:
(801)
363-1900

IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH

)

County of Salt Lake

)
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT

SZFCRE:

D*** j

/vc//

JUDGE

450 South 2nd East
ADDRESS

The undersigned affiant being first duly sworn, deposes and says
That he has reason to believe
(X)
on t h e p r e m i s e s
known^as
1268 Montgomery, 4one s t o r y
brown b r i c k r e s i d e n c e s 127 6 Montgomery, A one s t o r y
red
brick
residence,
with
a common d r i v e w a y and b a c k y a r d , *~d ^
t h e c u r t l i a g e of b o t h
and a w h i t e shed b e h i n d
1268
Montgomery,

f U - *-

In
the
City
of S a l t Lake, C o u n t y o f S a l t Lake, S t a t e of Utah,
i s now c e r t a i n p r o p e r t y or e v i d e n c e d e s c r i b e d as:

there

M a r i j u a n a p l a n t s , p s y c h e d e l i c mushrooms,
paraphernalia
for growing, h a r v e s t i n g , and p r o c e s s i n g t h e s e p l a n t s ,

used

and t h a r

s a i d p r o p e r t y or e v i d e n c e :
(X)
(X)
(X)
(X)

was u n l a w f u l l y a c q u i r e d o r i s u n l a w f u l l y p o s s e s s e d , o r
h a s been used t o commit o r c o n c e a l a p u b l i c o f f e n s e , o r
is
being possessed
with
t h e purpose t o use i t as a
means of c o m m i t t i n g o r c o n c e a l i n g a p u b l i c o f f e n s e , o r
c o n s i s t s of an i t e m o r c o n s t i t u t e s e v i d e n c e of
illegal
c o n d u c t , p o s s e s s e d by a p a r t y t o t h e i l l e g a l c o n d u c t .

Affiant
believes
the property
and
e v i d e n c e of t h e c r i m e (s) of c u l t i v a t i o n
substances.

evidence described
and p o s s e s s i o n
of

above
is
controlled

PAGE 2
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEZJiCH WARRANT
The facts
are:

to

establish the grounds for issuance of a Search Warrant

A phone call was made to Crime Solvers, by their informant
6637 who identified himself to Crime Solvers. 663*7 stated
a David and Susan Elkins lived in 1268 Montgomery and owned
the adjacent property 1276 Montgomery that was vacant.
That they used both homes and their attached greenhouses to
grow Marijuana and psychedelic mushrooms. 6637 stated that
he has confronted children who have possessed baggies of
marijuana brought from these buildings.
Your affiant and other officers walked down a canal that
runs behind these two properties. The two houses were seen
to possess many small details 6637 described to Crime
Solvers. Large plants were evident through the translucent
panels in the greenhouse including one pressed against the
panel that had the silhouette of a marijuana leaf.
The
unique smell of large quantities of green marijuana was
pervasive as your affiant and officer Caffery walked past
the backyards and the greenhouse.
Your
affiant
considers
the
information
received
from
the
confidential informant reliable because he fully identified himself
to Crime Solver. He has a particularized interest in the welfare of
one of the children.
Your
affiant
has
verified
the
above
confidential informant to be correct and
following independent investigation:

information from
accurate through

the
the

Ey confirming through public utilities that David Elkins
owns both homes. Ey walking by and confirming much detail
Of

6637' S

a c c o u n t M.*f\te

T V ^ QRftNJHOuseS ^ ^

^*C*f;-C>To Tr^ (CM? of. G-SVi Pr^eS,

WHEREFORE, the affiant prays that a Search Warrant be issued for the
seizure of said items:
^ • -r -o GAW
(X) in the day time, untii'~~xtr^?~' p.m

JvFFIAllT/
SU3SCRI5ED AND SWORN TO EEFORE M
ME
X this

,/';,.

m ^

y<S /ASafy'sof
^ a ' y s' b f ' ^ bby ^ rif e err ,

1988
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j u D G T i r T ^ p X r ^ j t< ClRCUIT COURT,
IK AND -•* , OR V ^£&r'ii^KE COUNTY, STATE

